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A REASONED APPROACH TO THE REFORM
OF SEX OFFENSE LEGISLATION
Ronald B. Schram*
Currently there is a widespread movement toward the revision of state
criminal codes. The goals of such an undertaking are varied: (1) to reduce
the size of the criminal law by eliminating inconsistent, overlapping, or
obsolete provisions; (2) to phrase the prohibitions in clear and concise
language; (3) to introduce more modern approaches to the definition and
treatment of criminal offenses; and (4) to harmonize the penalty imposed
for a particular act with the severity of the act and the penalty for other
acts. This paper will concentrate on sex offenses in an attempt to under-
stand the legislative process of reform, for this subject illustrates each of
the enumerated goals and poses in acute form the evidentiary and enforce-
ment considerations that must continually be borne in mind by the drafters
of a new criminal code. Moreover, the topic raises the difficult but im-
portant question whether law can affect private moral decisions or, more
specifically, whether it should regulate private sexual behavior.
Much of the reform activity has been prompted and aided by the de-
tailed research and final publication of the Model Penal Code in 1962.
A fair amount has been written on various sections of the Code. However,
very little has been written comparing the Model Code with newly enacted
or proposed state codes. This paper will concentrate on the New York
Code and the Proposed Michigan Code and, comparing their provisions
with those of the Model Code, will seek to evaluate the differences and
similarities in treatment and will present specific suggestions to improve
the state revisions in the form of a Proposed Penal Code.1 The analysis
will focus on three broad categories of sex offenses: statutory and forcible
rape, private sexual behavior between consenting adults, and the miscel-
laneous offenses (nonconsensual sodomy, sexual misconduct, indecent ex-
posure, and sexual assault).
I. Rape
The common law provided for statutory and forcible rape. 2 The modern
codes retain this classification but distinguish three degrees of the offense.
The Michigan and New York Codes expand the common law coverage
*Mr. Schram is a member of the Staff of Prospectus.
1 See pp. 158-161, infra.
2 The common law's one degree of rape included forcible intercourse with a woman
not married to the actor, intercourse with a physically helpless woman incapable
of consent, and intercourse with a girl under 10 years old (See general discussion
in R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 122-123 (1957) ).
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with a more amplified and refined definition of statutory rape.3 These
codes continue to identify the behavior proscribed as forcible rape with
reference to the consent standard which focuses on the subjective state
of mind of the female victim. 4 On the other hand, the Model Penal
Code's three-degree classification stems largely from a more detailed
identification of the conduct which is punished as forcible rape.5 For this
purpose, it adopts the resistance standard which concentrates attention
on the actual behavior of the victim and its causal relation to the actor's
conduct. 6 The first question to which we turn is which standard is the
more appropriate to govern the forcible rape offense and whether it makes
any difference which one is followed.
A. Forcible Rape
1. Resistance Versus Consent Standard
The New York and Michigan Codes, although stressing the consent
standard, include references to resistance. 7 However, there is a difference
between using resistance as an outward manifestation of nonconsent (as
under the state codes) and using "resistance itself as the test of whether
a protected interest has been violated." 8 The resistance standard is more
objective and eliminates consideration of "the participating woman's sub-
jective attitude, which may be unclear even to herself, inaccurately re-
flected in her behavior, and easily distorted in recall." 9 Moreover, the
resistance standard permits the law to differentiate between "offenses which
differ materially in danger to the woman, danger to the community, and
heinousness of the defendant's act."'1 0 Although the Model's commentary
does not articulate any reasons for its adoption of the resistance standard,
such reasons as the above seem persuasive. A restatement of the law of
3 MICHIGAN REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, §§ 2310(1)(c), 2311(1), and 2312
(l)(b) (Final Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as Michigan]. N. Y. PEN.
LAW, §§ 130.25(2), .30, .35(3) (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as N. Y.].
These state codes also recognize two degrees of forcible rape rather than the one
recognized at common law.
4 Both codes specify the victim's lack of consent as an element of every offense (with
the exception of consensual sodomy in New York). See NY § 130.05 and Mich-
igan § 2330(1).
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited
as Model]. This Code goes one step beyond the common law in distinguishing
two degrees of statutory rape but not as far as the New York and Michigan
Codes which recognize three degrees.
6See Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Resistance Standard].
7 Michigan § 2301(h), N.Y. § 130.00(8). These are identical: "'Forcible compulsion'
means physical force that overcomes earnest resistance."
8 Resistance Standard 684.
9 Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Ob-
jectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 70 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as Consent Standard].
10 Resistance Standard at 683.
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forcible rape in terms of the resistance displayed by the victim is desirable,
for it would reflect more adequately the deterrent and rehabilitative aims
of the criminal law.
One writer contends that despite its limitations, the consent standard
is justifiedby such policy considerations as the following: it "protect[s]
a significant item of social currency for women"; it encourages "a mas-
culine pride in the exclusive possession of a sexual object"; and it channels
toward rapists the vengeance that derives from a male's fear of losing his
sexual partner." Yet as another writer has more recently pointed out
in response to the above argument: "the 'resistance standard' . . . serves
the same ends equally well and cures the serious defects in the present
consent-oriented law of rape."1 2 For this reason, the merits of the
argument balance out in favor of the resistance standard.
This Proposed Code adopts the resistance standard for forcible rape. 13
Legislatures seem reluctant to embrace such a standard out of fear that
the general public will interpret this reform as a lessening of the punish-
ment of rapists. As will be shown in more detail later, this fear permeates
all criminal law reform but has little basis in fact.
2. Types of Threats Covered
The Michigan, New York, and Model Penal Codes recognize that
forcible rape may be committed by a man who compels a woman to sub-
mit to sexual intercourse by threatening immediate death, serious physical
injury or kidnapping.1 4 The state codes have adopted two of the Model's
innovations in this area by imposing liability even where the female's fear is
unreasonable and by including threats which are directed toward anyone,
rather than only those aimed at the victim herself or one of her relatives.
The Proposed Code recommends similar treatment.15 A reasonableness
requirement might seem desirable to eliminate the subjectivity that typically
arises in rape cases. However, the more dominant consideration is that an
unreasonable fear can be just as compelling from the point of view of the
particular female victim. Artificial restrictions on the group of persons
toward whom threats may be channelled are unlikely to isolate those threats
which are so compelling as to overcome the female's will to resist. In
any given case, a threat of immediate death to her fiance or boy friend,
beloved teacher or family friend might be as effective as a threat of harm
to her relatives.
Threats of non-physical harm may also be compelling. Such threats are
ignored by the Michigan and New York Codes possibly due to their stress
on the consent standard and possibly due to the infrequency of such threats.
The recognition of such threats and the espousal of "an objective test of the
11 Consent Standard at 72-73.
12 Resistance Standard at 684.
13 See §§2(1)-(3) and §§4(1)-(4), p. 159, infra.
14 Michigan §2301(h); Model §213.1(1)(a); N.Y. §130.00(8).
15 See, Proposed Code §2(2), p. 159, infra.
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efficiency of the coercive element" is a further advantage of the resistance
standard.16
B. Statutory Rape: Presumption of Non-Consent
1. Traditional Approach - A Conclusive Presumption
The primary issue is whether the presumption of non-consent for under-
age females should be made rebuttable. Traditionally codes make this
presumption conclusive for two reasons. First, it is assumed that "a girl's
sexual indulgence or virginity [is] a 'thing' of social, economic, and per-
sonal value."17 Since an underage female lacks the capacity to understand
the nature of the sexual act, the law should protect her against her own
consent. This rationale is hardly persuasive. The girl's maturity should be
the relevant factor in determining her ability to comprehend sexual inter-
course. "Both actual sexual experience and learning from the cultural
group to which the girl belongs will determine her level of comprehen-
sion."18 The second ground on which such a conclusive presumption rests
is the likelihood that underage girls will suffer psychic or physical injury
from the sexual act. However, once the age of puberty is reached there
is less danger of such harm. 9 Recognizing such social and medical
realities, the Model Code makes the presumption of nonconsent for under-
age girls rebuttable by either of two considerations -reasonable mistake
as to age 20 and previous unchastity of the victim.2 1
2. Model Penal Code Approach - A Rebuttable Presumption
(a) Reasonable Mistake as to Age. None of the major revised codes
accept the Model's position that reasonable mistake as to age should con-
stitute an absolute defense. 22 The New York Code, without articulating
any reasons, totally rejects the mistake of age as a defense or a miti-
gating factor.2 3 As discussed above, this is clearly unsatisfactory.
The Michigan Code, in a wordy and almost incomprehensible provision,
proposes that such mistakes be a defense even if unreasonable. 24 This con-
stitutes a change from present law under which mistake as to age is no
16 Model Penal Code, §§207.4, comment at 248 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) [herein-
after cited as Tent. Draft No. 4]. See Model §213.1(2) (a).
17 Consent Standard at 76.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Model §213.6(1).
21 Model §213.6(3).
22 Compare with the Model Code's provision the statute suggested by the student
writer in 62 YALE L.J. 55,80. It should be noted that the Model Code does not
allow as a defense a reasonable mistake that the female was over 10 years old.
"Any error would still have the young girl victim far below the age for sexual
pursuit by normal males." Tent. Draft No. 4 at 253.23 N.Y. §15.20(3).
24 Michigan at 192: "There is no requirement that the mistake be 'reasonable'."
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defense in an action for statutory rape.2 5 The comments imply that the
reason "that no 'substantive' limitation of reasonableness is required" is
that the procedural rules accompanying the reliance on the defense of
mistake will present the jury with an opportunity to evaluate the de-
fendant's credibility and that the reasonableness of his mistake will be
a factor to be considered by the jury.2 6 The Michigan Code denies that
there can be an offense such as negligent statutory rape. It is submitted
that the Michigan Code's approach goes too far in the direction of pro-
tecting defendants. Surely a person exhibits a socially dangerous ab-
normality by acting on an unreasonable, albeit honest, belief as to the
girl's age. Both the rehabilitative and deterrent functions of the criminal
law would be served by punishing him.
The Illinois Code adopts the view that mistake as to age, if reasonable,
is a mitigating circumstance which reduces the offense to a misdemeanor. 2 7
This is an improvement over the other two codes. However, one might
ask whether such a person should be punished at all. The law is intended
to protect naive young girls who lack the capacity to understand the
implications of the sexual act. If it reasonably appeared that she was
capable of understanding the act, the male actor has not taken advantage
of her innocence. Moreover, he lacks the requisite mens rea because he
did not intend to engage in sexual intercourse with an underage female.
With respect to the element of the offense that the girl be less than the
statutory age of consent, he was not even negligent because his mistake
was reasonable. If some mens rea is required for the conviction of the
felony, then it is illogical to eliminate it and impose strict liability in order
to convict as a misdemeanor for the same act. If fornication were a crime
(and it is not in Illinois) then perhaps such an approach would be an
acceptable way to introduce another degree of punishment into the offense.
Even though his mistake was reasonable he still would be engaging in an
unlawful act and thus his reasonable mistake should not be a complete
defense. However, even then such conduct would be more logically
punished under the fornication laws than as a misdemeanor under the
rape laws.
The Model Penal Code's approach is superior to the provisions enacted
by the above state codes. It recommends that reasonable mistake as to age
be an absolute defense because a female may be capable of understanding
the nature of sexual intercourse and thus capable of consenting even
though she is under the statutory age of consent. This provision might be
questioned since there seems little reason for using a fixed age of consent,
thereby offering the defendant a chance to rebut the presumption of non-
consent when his victim is below this age. It is more logical to judge the
offense of statutory rape in relation to a flexible and subjective test of
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Committee Comments to § 11-4 & § 11-5, ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. 38 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
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the female's maturity and eliminate any resort to presumptions. Although
this might be more logical within the limited confines of this defense, it
conflicts with the policy, stressed in the above discussed preference for the
resistance standard, that the law should eliminate as far as possible such
subjective considerations as the victim's state of mind. Moreover, the test
of maturity seems unworkable due to its ambiguity and it might deter
enforcement of the statutory rape laws by shifting the burden of proof on
this element to the prosecution. For these reasons, the Proposed Penal
Code adopts the Model's approach that statutory rape should be defined
with respect to a fixed age of consent but that reasonable mistake as to
the female's age should be a complete defense. 28
(b) Previous Unchastity of the Victim. Under the Model Penal Code
it is a defense to statutory rape that the alleged victim has had promiscuous
sexual relations with others. At first glance, this seems to be a sensible
defense because the goal of the law in this area is to protect only the
innocent and inexperienced youth. But both the Michigan and New
York Codes reject it. The Michigan commentary suggests a preference
for reliance on "the amplified doctrine of mistake" (which encompasses
even unreasonable mistakes). 29 This should provide sufficient protection
to a defendant charged with statutory rape, since circumstantial evidence
that suggests promiscuity is admissible as relevant to the question of
mistake.
As discussed above, the Proposed Code limits the mistake doctrine to
reasonable mistakes. Still on the basis of the following practical reasons
this Code rejects previous promiscuous behavior as an absolute defense
but retains it as relevant to the issue of mistake.30 The Michigan Code's
refusal to endorse this defense stems partly from a desire to avoid "the
unwarranted slanders on the complainant's sexual life that the defendant's
'oath-helpers' are likely to perpetrate." 3 1 If the defense were approved,
the trial in a statutory rape case might become an unseemly examination
of the complainant's character. This might deter the prosecution of
legitimate complaints as well as offer little protection to the male actor
who is "unable to persuade others to acknowledge unlawful sexual rela-
tions in open court." 32 Another practical objection is that even where this
defense is defined by statute to be an "affirmative" one the ultimate
burden of proof on the girl's non-consent remains on the prosecution.
This, of course, weakens the heart- of the statutory rape offense-that
the prosecution is given the benefit of a presumption of non-consent. This
might effectively hinder the prosecution of such charges. Moreover, since
28 The statutory rape provisions are set out in §2(4), §3 and §4(5), p. 159, infra.
The reasonable mistake defense is contained in § 12, p. 161, infra.
29 Michigan at 193.
30 See §12(3), p. 161, infra.
31 Michigan at 193.
32 Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1543
(1964).
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the vast majority of statutory rape cases are misdemeanors, the defense is
not necessary to avoid extreme penalties inflicted on defendants who them-
selves might have been victimized. Such practical considerations weigh
against the inclusion of promiscuity as an absolute defense in the Proposed
Code.
C. The Substantive Elements
The proscribed activity of sexual intercourse is defined by the Model
Penal Code to include "intercourse per os or per anum, with some pene-
tration however slight." 3 3 The New York and Michigan Codes also follow
this "any penetration" rule. Ploscowe has criticized this rule "as punishing
attempt rather than the completed offense" but the rule seems necessary in
the light of difficulty of proof. 34 However, the New York and Michigan
Codes do not adopt the broad concept of sexual intercourse offered in the
other part of the Model Code's definition. Instead, these codes state that
"sexual intercourse has its ordinary meaning." 35 This definition is vague
and does not clearly indicate what is deemed criminal. Yet vagueness is
not a decisive consideration in this context. Unlike vague statutes that
infringe on First Amendment rights and deter socially desirable conduct,
overly vague rape statutes deter socially undesirable behavior. Still ad-
ministration of the statute would be furthered by a clearer definition of
sexual intercourse as provided in the Proposed Code.36
The Model Code's commentary explains its reason for a broader cov-
erage: "From the point of view of the woman who is attacked, these
deviate forms of aggression would usually be equally shocking and ab-
horrent." 3 7 This may be true but these deviant forms are adequately
punished under the sodomy laws. The rape provisions should be limited
to sexual intercourse in the sense of genital copulation.
The Model, New York and Michigan Codes all require that the sexual
intercourse be with a female who is not the actor's wife. While the
New York Code does not specifically define wife, the Michigan and
Model Penal Codes do.3S Thus it is unclear whether the New York Code
is intended to apply to persons living together as husband and wife but
not legally married or to those living apart under a judicial decree of
separation. These situations should be anticipated and covered in the
Code to fulfill the goal of clearly defining the illegal conduct.
Unlike the Wisconsin Code, the Michigan and New York Codes do
not explicitly outline the level of mens rea that is necessary with respect
3 3 Model §213.1.34 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 244.
35 N.Y. §130.00(1), Michigan §2301 (a).
36 See Proposed Code §1(1), p. 158, infra.
37 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 243-244.
3 8 Model §213.6(2), Michigan §2301(d). See also §1(4) of the Proposed Code, p.
158, infra.
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to the element of the offense that the female is not his wife. 39 Reliance
on the general mens rea provision is preferable since the specification that
knowledge is required would demand the allegation and proof of this
element beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not wise to impose such a proof
burden on the prosecution in all cases since the problem is likely to arise
infrequently and then the defendant will undoubtedly inject the issue
himself.
The Model, New York and Michigan Codes, all "recognize that imma-
ture males may themselves be victims of adolescence rather than engaged
in exploitation of others' inexperience."40 An effective way to exclude
sexual experimentation from legal condemnation is "to require a substantial
age differential in favor of the male." 4 1 Any such formulation will in-
evitably lead to the drawing of somewhat arbitrary distinctions. For
example, under the New York Code, if the victim is over fourteen but
under seventeen, then a twenty-year old male commits a misdemeanor
punishable under N.Y. § 130.20(1) by a maximum of one year imprison-
ment. Yet a twenty-one year old male who has sexual intercourse with
a girl between the same age limits commits a felony under N.Y. § 130.25
(2) punishable by a maximum of four years. The new statutory arrange-
ment "eliminates some incongruities" since the twenty-one year old was
subject to a maximum of ten years imprisonment under the old law. 42
§ 213.3(1) of the Model Code precludes such an arbitrary result: "A
male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife ... is guilty of
an offense if ... the other person is less than 16 years old and the actor
is at least 4 years older than the other person." It is true that such a formu-
lation would also necessitate the drawing of some lines - for example, be-
tween an 18 year old who had intercourse with a 14 year old and one who
had intercourse with a 15 year old. Still it is this very thin line that is neces-
sary to exclude playful experimentation from condemnation. Thus the Pro-
posed Code adopts the approach of the Model Code.43
D. Procedural Safeguards
The Model Penal Code proposes two procedural safeguards to ensure
the defendant a fair trial. The first provides that failure to bring a com-
plaint within three months of the alleged rape is a complete defense. 44
Neither the Michigan nor the New York Code adopts such a short statute
39 WIS. STAT. ANN. §944.01(1): "Any male who has sexual intercourse with a female
he knows is not his wife, by force and against her will, may be imprisoned not
more than 30 years."
40 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 253.
41 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 253.
42 N. Y. TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE,
PROPOSED PENAL LAW (1964) at 343 [hereinafter New York Proposed Penal
Law].
43 See Proposed Code, §4(5), p. 159, infra.
44 Model §213.6(5).
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of limitations for rape, presumably on the ground that a victim may
naturally hesitate to file a complaint because of a sense of shame and the
embarrassment of reliving the event at trial. Yet, since the evidence in
rape cases usually consists of the subjective testimony of the participants
and easily forgotten circumstantial evidence, a prompt complaint is im-
portant to ensure fresh evidence. Equally important is the need to prevent
the female from converting later moralistic misgivings into a criminal
complaint. A three month period is still long enough for the female to
overcome her initial repression and decide to speak out against the attacker.
The second procedural protection offered by the Model Penal Code is
the requirement that for all felony offenses the testimony of the alleged
victim must be corroborated. 4 5 The Michigan Code fails to incorporate
this safeguard. However, the New York Code extends the corroboration
requirement beyond felonies to include all sex offenses except third degree
sexual abuse. 4 6 An exception is made for that offense because "of the
difficulty of obtaining corroborative evidence in such cases and of the low
penalty for this offense." 4 7 This implies that corroborative evidence can
be obtained in rape cases, despite the fact that there are usually no
witnesses to a rape other than, the parties. For example, corroborative
evidence can be circumstantial. Wigmore is opposed to the corroboration
requirement on the ground that it is unnecessary in light of "the court's
power to set aside a verdict for insufficient evidence," 4 s and that "it tends
to produce reliance upon a rule of thumb." 49 Notwithstanding this view,
there can be no doubt that the testimony of a sex victim is very untrust-
worthy. As Glanville Williams points out,
Sexual cases are particularly subject to the danger of deliberately false
charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or
simply a girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which
she is now ashamed.50
At least until psychologists are better able to predict the reactions of an
average person in the alleged victim's position, corroboration should be
required to ensure the accuracy of the female's testimony. Wigmore may
be right that it is not "necessary" but it does protect defendants against
45 Model §213.6(6).46N.Y. §130.15. Third degree sexual abuse is defined by N.Y. §130.55 as follows:
"A person is guilty .. .when he subjects another person to sexual contact
without the latter's consent; except that in any prosecution under this section,
it is an affirmative defense that (a) such other person's lack of consent was due
solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being less than seventeen years old
and (b) such other person was more than fourteen years old, and (c) the
defendant was less than five years older than such other person."
47 N.Y. at 308.
48 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 264.
49 Williams, Corroboration - Sexual Cases, 1962 CRIM. L. Rev. 662, 663.
5o Id. at 662.
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unfounded convictions. It is unlikely to do much harm, especially if excep-
tions are made for those offenses where the corroboration requirement
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy.
H!. Private Sexual Behavior Between Consenting Adults
The Model Penal Code does not punish private sexual conduct between
consenting adults. Hence, consensual sodomy, adultery, fornication, and
seduction are not crimes under the Code. The Michigan Code and this
Proposed Code recommend similar treatment. Although the Illinois and
New York Codes do not punish private sexual activity between spouses,
neither goes as far as the Model or Michigan Codes in removing private
behavior from the criminal law. The New York Draft recommended
adoption of the Model Code's approach, but the New York legislature
insisted on additional provisions declaring consensual sodomy and adultery
criminal.51 The Illinois Code, on the other hand, makes only adultery a
crime. 5 2 Such divergent approaches suggest the emotional considerations
and political constraints that plague law reformers. 53
A. Arguments Against Reforms
Three closely related arguments are put forward by the opponents of
any reform with respect to private sexual acts. First, it is claimed that the
criminal law provides a source of moral standards for many people,
especially the non-religious. This was one of the concerns expressed by
the British government in the early Parliamentary debates on the reform
of homosexuality laws. 5 4 Lon Fuller eloquently stated the argument in
this way:
The view I am expounding . . . concedes that the effective deterrents
which shape the average man's conduct derive from morality, from
a sense of right and wrong. What it asserts is that these conceptions of
right and wrong are significantly shaped by the daily functionings of
the legal order, and that they would be profoundly altered if the
legal order were to disappear.55
51N. Y. § 130.38, §255.17.
52 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 11-7 (Smith-Hurd, 1964).
53 Cf. Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscrip-
tion, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 291, 292 (1966): "It seems inconsistent that those
who base their opposition to deviate sexual activity on grounds of 'immorality'
do not object to fornication for the same reason."
"4 Commons Debate on the Wolfenden Report, 122 J.P. 796 (1958): "... [M]any
people who were outside the influence of religion found no other basis for their
notions of right and wrong but in the criminal law. Could they [the Government]
be sure that if they removed the support of the criminal law from those people
they would find any other support?"
55 L. Fuller, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 137 (1940), quoted in Cutter, Sexual
Offenses - Legal and Moral Considerations, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 94, 105 (1963).
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Fuller's premise is subject to question since there is evidence that our
moral standards are only "minimally affected" by our awareness of the
law. 56 The argument also loses much of its persuasiveness when we
consider the side effects of the present laws. The search and seizure
limitations of the Fourth Amendment make it difficult to enforce such
laws against private behavior. Selective enforcement of these laws not
only increases the possibility of blackmail, but also breeds disrespect for
law in general. Moreover, it is not true that law is the only restraint on
sexual behavior. One writer has pointed out that "the concerted effort
of home, school, and church, supplemented if need be by various forms
of social ostracism, suffices to inculcate individual restraint in private sex
relations."5 7
The second argument often advanced in favor of the present sex laws is
that a vote for repeal would be interpreted as a vote for immorality. Dis-
cussing the Wolfenden Report5S which recommended the repeal of British
laws that condemned private homosexual behavior between consenting
adults, British legislators initially feared that "[m]any people would at
present misunderstand the removal of the prohibition as implying, if not
approval, at least condonation by the legislature of homosexual conduct."5 9
Yet these fears were finally overcome with the passage of repeal legisla-
tion in mid-1967. Repeal will not be considered as a vote for immorality
if me legisiature and public understand the crucial distinction between sin
and crime that underlies the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal
Code. If private sexual acts are not deemed crimes, it will be because
the law prefers to leave these to the province of the church, and not
because the law declares them to be moral. As the Model Code sees it,
the law "cannot undertake or pretend to draw the line where religion
and morals would draw it."60 Instead a vote for repeal would be more
accurately viewed as "the admission of a reality." 61 For one thing, the
laws are not being enforced. For another, it is doubtful if the law can
change the behavior of homosexuals. "Changes in their patterns of be-
havior can be brought about only by influences more personal than the
mailed fist of the law." 62
Thirdly, it is argued that repeal of the laws would increase the incidence
56 Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others
in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REV. 581, 595 (1967); See Walter
& Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570
(1964).
57 Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations and Criminal Offenses, 17 U. CHI. L.
REV. 162, 179 (1949).
58 Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, CMND. No. 247
(1957).
59 122 J. P., note 54 supra, at 796.
60 Model Penal Code, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1955).61 Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83, 92 (1959).
62 Id.
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of such acts with consequent harmful effects upon society.6 3 This was
basically the ground on which the Catholic Welfare Committee, a powerful
force but not an official church organ, opposed the changes recommended
by the New York Draft.64 Repeal of the homosexuality laws did not lead
to any noticeable increase in such behavior in either Sweden65 or The
Netherlands. 6 6 It is conceded that such arguments "are hard to refute
on empirical grounds, especially where the effects, if any, are likely
to be subtle and only shown over a long time span." 6 7 Still this
argument is far outweighed by the benefits that would derive from re-
moving the legal condemnation of private consensual sexual conduct.
B. Arguments For Reform
There are essentially three reasons that reform is desirable in this area.
First, issues of morality are personal, and to promote moral responsibility
the law should allow each individual to make his own decision. 68 The
ascendancy of situation ethics among today's young adults has an important
bearing on this problem. It is difficult for the law to proscribe any private
behavior because there is little consensus on which behavior is immoral.
The answer depends on the situation, the context and the prior relationship
of the parties. As one sociologist has acutely observed:
In part, the lack of clarity of sex codes is due to the specificity of sex
attitudes. Whether premarital intercourse is viewed as acceptable or
not depends on many features of the relation between the couples. 6 9
Secondly, reform is necessary to eliminate the undesirable consequences
of our present sex laws with respect to private consensual behavior. Such
laws do not promote the rehabilitative or deterrent goals of the criminal
law. The short term of imprisonment (three months under the New York
Code) offers little opportunity to rehabilitate the convicted offender.
Criminal penalties are not able to cure such persons. As the Michigan
Comments point out "homosexuality is symptomatic of psychological dis-
order, stemming from a failure to achieve mature psychic development,
and . . . it cannot be cured unless the underlying psychological deviation
is cured." 70 Similarly, the infrequency with which such violations are
63 "Could they [the Government] be certain that homosexual conduct between con-
senting adults was not a source of harm to others?" 122 J.P. 796 (1958).
64 30 ALBANY L. REV., note 53 supra, at 293.
65 Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement,
70 YALE L.J. 623, 630 (1961).
66N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1967, §6 (Magazine), at 66.
6 7 Wheeler, Sex Offenses: A Sociological Critique, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 258,
262 (1960).
68 30 ALBANY L. REV., note 53 supra, at 294.
69 Wheeler, note 67 supra, at 269.
70 Michigan at 186.
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reported and the consequent low penalty renders the deterrent effect of
the law quite weak. Furthermore, without invading the privacy of a person
who is engaging in unlawful conduct with a consenting adult, the police
will not have sufficient evidence to establish a violation. Such intrusions
are limited by the search and seizure strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
If the police ignore this constitutional protection, the exclusionary rule
of Weeks v. United States,7 1 as applied to the states by Mapp v. Ohio,72
will prevent the use of such unlawfully obtained evidence at trial. Hence,
these laws encounter practical enforcement problems which encourage
blackmail and the resort to such disrespected enforcement practices as
entrapment.
Finally a strong argument can be formulated that the enforcement of
such laws is unconstitutional. These laws infringe upon the individual's
privacy both by promoting "police surveillance of private activities" and
by encroaching on the individual's right to decide for himself whether to
engage in certain sexual activities in private. 73 Mr. Justice Goldberg's
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut suggested that the constitutionality of
adultery and fornication statutes is "beyond doubt" because they are neces-
sary to safeguard marital fidelity and discourage extra-marital relations
which are legitimate state concerns.7 4 That dictum might be questioned,
for Griswold involved a state statute that prevented the use of birth con-
trol devices by married couples. The Court held that this statute contra-
vened the "right of privacy in the marital relation"7 5 which emanated from
various guarantees in the Bill of Rights especially from the Ninth Amend-
ment. If such a limited right of privacy emanates from these Amendments
whizh do not mention the marital relation, arguably a more general right
of privacy can be found in these Amendments. If so, the law may not
legitimately proscribe private consensual sexual behavior. An individual
would have the right to engage in any behavior he so desired if this was
done in private and with a consenting adult so that no one was harmed.
The constitutional objection grows even stronger with respect to the
homosexuality laws. Here the state's interest in preserving the marriage
relation is less relevant. The Supreme Court has said: "Where there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail
only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." 76 Since
no one is harmed by private consensual conduct, it is difficult to imagine
a state interest that is sufficiently "compelling" to support the legal con-
demnation of homosexuality.77
71232 U.S. 383 (1914).
72 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73 30 ALBANY L. REV., note 53 supra, at 295.
74 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1964).
75 Id. at 499.
76 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959).
77 Cf. 14 UCLA L. REv. 581, note 56 supra.
April 1968]
Prospectus
C. Legislative Hurdles
On balance, there seems little doubt that the arguments for reform are
more persuasive. Why then did the New York legislature override the
draft committee's recommendations and decline to change the laws? It
has been pointed out that the Catholic Welfare Committee played an
important role in opposition. But it is perplexing to explain the un-
derlying reason for its opposition and the persuasiveness of its position.
Other predominantly Catholic countries like France, Italy, Mexico, and
Uruguay "make no attempt to enforce by law what the church forbids as
sin."7 S Moreover, official Catholic thinking in Britain did not unalterably
oppose the elimination of the prohibition against homosexual acts between
consenting adults. The Archbishop of Westminster pointed out that:
As regards the moral law, Catholic moral teaching is:
(i) Homosexual acts are grievously sinful.
(ii) That in view of the public consequences of these acts, e.g., the
harm which would result to the common good if homosexual
conduct became widespread or an accepted mode of conduct
in the public mind, the civil law does not exceed its legitimate
scope if it attempts to control them by making them crimes. 79
Yet the Archbishop also stressed two questions of fact on which "Catholics
are free to make up their own minds":
(i) If the law takes cognizance of private acts of homosexuality and
makes them crimes, do worse evils follow for the common good?
(ii) Since homosexual acts between consenting males are now crimes
in law, would a change in the law harm the common good by
seeming to condone homosexual conduct?8 0
It has been argued above that the answers to these "questions of fact"
support repeal of the laws regulating private consensual sexual behavior.
The treatment of such behavior as criminal does have undesirable con-
sequences for society. And the repeal of these laws will not signify that
the conduct is moral, but only that it is more appropriately treated by
church authorities as sin than by the law as crime.
A similar analytical scheme could be presented to American legislatures
to counteract the arguments of those constituents of key legislators who
oppose such legislation on religious or moral grounds. In addition,
law reformers might be advised to take an opinion poll among Cath-
olics on this issue to ease the conscience of a legislator who wants
7s Tent. Draft No. 4 at 278.
79 Quoted in Cavanagh, Sexual Anomalies and the Law, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 4, 6-7
(1963).
SO Id. at 7.
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to approve reform but feels constrained by the nature of his own re-
ligion or that of his constituency. Moreover, it should be continually
stressed that this conduct is more appropriately treated as a sin than as a
crime. This is likely to appeal to church groups and garner needed sup-
port for the reforms. In this connection the testimony given to the Wol-
fenden Committee by the Church of England Moral Welfare Council is
relevant:
It is not the function of the State and law to constitute themselves
guardians of private morality, and thus to deal with sin as such belongs
to the province of the Church.81
The bulwark of opposition does not appear to be invincible on this
issue. Yet it will take an effective effort of education and public rela-
tions for the reformers to secure legislative approval. As one theologian
has aptly put it: "The range and complexity of sex laws at present 'on
the books' is a monument to tongue-in-the-cheek legislation and to the
'prohibitionist fallacy.' "82 Where reform is so badly needed we should
be able to convince our legislators not to abdicate their responsibility.
III. Miscellaneous Sex Offenses
This section will treat four offenses which raise less controversial prob-
lems than rape and private consensual conduct: sodomy (non-consensual),
sexual misconduct, indecent exposure, and sexual assault. As above, the
relation of the offense to the goals of criminal law and a clear definition
of the forbidden conduct are the hallmarks of a well-drafted code.
A. Sodomy
The sodomy laws traditionally proscribe various forms of deviant
sexual intercourse including fellatio (oral stimulus of the male sex organ),
cunnilingus (oral stimulus of the female sex organ), bestiality (intercourse
with an animal), and necrophilia (intercourse with a corpse). In general,
under the Michigan, New York and Model Codes, what would be
unlawful heterosexual activity under the heading of rape constitutes
sodomy if it involves deviate sexual intercourse. This organizational
similarity is an attempt to facilitate the administration of the law. Much
of the discussion above in reference to rape-resistance standard, mis-
take of female's age, etc.- is equally relevant to the sodomy provisions.
The Model Penal Code declares bestiality a crime,8 3 a course followed
by the New York Code with a maximum one-year imprisonment (rather
81 Quoted in Cutter, note 55 supra, at 96.
82 Fletcher, Sex Offenses: An Ethical View, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 244, 248
(1960).83 Model §213.2(1).
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than the 20-year maximum provided under the old New York Code).8 4
The Proposed Code, like the Michigan and Illinois Codes, finds the
retention of bestiality as a crime to be unnecessary. The Michigan com-
mentary stresses that such conduct "is rare and is of course patholog-
ical."8 5 It points out that any prosecution for this activity can be laid
under the cruelty to animals provision, if a defense for mental disease is
not available. Since one of the goals of a criminal code revision should
be an elimination of overlapping or rarely used laws, this is the more
satisfactory approach. The comments to the Illinois Code suggest a second
reason for not making bestiality a crime: "focusing public attention on
the person who happens to be found in such an act serves no useful social
purpose and may seriously impair the development of the accused to
normal life."8 6 The New York drafters recognized that "the offender is
a sick individual who injures himself more than he does the public." 8 7
However, they concluded that "misdemeanor punishment is more than
adequate for this crime." (Emphasis added)88 The goal of criminal law
is to match the level of punishment to the crime and not to overpunish
an individual. It appears that the New York Code has erred in this
respect. Recognizing the need for rehabilitative treatment, an alternative
to punishment or total freedom might be civil commitment.
The New York Code, unlike the Michigan or Model Codes, also
punishes necrophilia.S9 Criticism of such a provision might be made on
grounds similar to the above. The rare prosecution for such activity is
better handled under the abuse of corpse provisions.
B. Sexual Misconduct
The New York and Michigan Codes provide that a person commits
the crime of sexual misconduct if:
"(a) Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female
without her consent; or
(b) Being a female, she engages in sexual intercourse with a male
without his consent; or
(c) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person with-
out the latter's consent." 90
For two reasons, this is an undesirable provision. First, it seems question-
able to shield the immature from sexual activity by "indiscriminate im-
position of criminality upon young boys and girls." 9 1 Recognizing that
84N. Y. §130.20(3).
s5 Michigan at 182.
86 ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 11-2 commentary at 592 (Smith-Hurd, 1964).
87 New York Proposed Penal Law at 344.
88 Id.
89 N.Y. §130.20(3).
90 Michigan §2305; N.Y. § 130.20 omits sub-section (b).
91 64 COLUM. L. REV., note 32 supra, at 1544.
[Vol. 1 : 1
Sex Offense Legislation
"immature males may themselves be victims of adolescence," the Model
Code, in its statutory rape and sodomy provisions, requires that the male
be four years older than the female. 92 The Model Comments express the
opinion that "existing statutory provisions under which the rape label is
applied to sexual experimentation by a girl just under and a boy just over
16 seem harsh and unreasonable." 93 This would be the situation under
the New York or Michigan Codes. The New York Comments recognize
this argument:
The young defendant here does not force the victim into committing
the act, nor is the victim suffering from any physical or mental in-
firmity. In fact the defendant may well have been persuaded by the
"victim" to commit the act. 94
The New York drafters felt that this was a reason for reducing the of-
fense to a misdemeanor. Yet there is no good reason to punish the
defendant at all if he might have been induced by the victim to engage
in such acts.
The second reason for dissatisfaction with the sexual misconduct pro-
visions is that these embrace the sodomy and rape provisions and thus
constitute catch-alls virtually assuring a conviction. These provisions may
be necessary in order to facilitate plea bargaining and ensure reasonably
satisfactory enforcement of the law. Still they may be used to harass the
defendant, since the sexual misconduct provisions suggest that "the de-
fendant is regarded as guilty to begin with, and all effort must be made
to convict the guilty, no matter how many innocent people may suffer." 9 5
C. Indecent Exposure
The Model Code makes it a crime "if, for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any person other than his spouse,
[a person exposes] his genitals under circumstances in which he knows
his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm." 9 6 The Michigan Code
follows substantially the same form9 7 and its commentary stresses that "it
is not the place, but the purpose of the exposure and the likelihood of
psychological harm to others, that determine the actor's criminality." 98
The approach of the New York Code is quite different. It requires that
the act be committed "in a public place." 99 This formulation does not
92 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 253.
93 Id. at 254.94 New York Proposed Penal Law at 342.
95 Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP.
L.Q. 273, 292 (1956).
96 Model §213.5
97 Michigan §2325.
98 Michigan at 190.
99 N. Y. §245.00.
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adequately reflect the reasons for punishing indecent exposure. Moreover,
it is sufficiently ambiguous to raise the difficult definitional problem of
what is a public place. The New York provision suffers from vagueness
in other respects too. Instead of punishing the exposure of "genitals" as
under the Michigan Code, it proscribes the exposure of "private or intimate
parts of his body" or the commission of "any other lewd act." While
neither of these phrases clearly specifies or defines the forbidden con-
duct, vagueness may not be too critical in this area since if persons steer
away from such conduct out of fear that it might be covered by the
statutory language, society does not lose anything of value.
The codes also differ in the degree of punishment attached to indecent
exposure. The Model Code sets the maximum at one year imprisonment,1 00
but New York lowers this to a three-month maximum01 and Michigan
lowers it even further to thirty days.1 02 It might seem that only the Model
Code's proposed penalty would promote the deterrent and rehabilitative
aims of the law with respect to the exhibitionist. Yet more vigorous en-
forcement of this offense would probably result if the punishment for a
first offender were less than a year. Ploscowe notes that "stiffer penalties
may be necessary in particular cases, to help the exhibitionist control his
compulsion."'03 However, this could be provided in the form of higher
penalties for recidivists.
D. Sexual Assault
The Model, New York and Michigan Codes all deal specially with the
sexual as distinguished from the ordinary assault.104 This is desirable be-
cause the focus of concern in this area is "on the outrage, disgust or shame
engendered in the victim rather than fear of physical injury or violence."1 0 5
Each of the codes prohibits "sexual contact" which is defined in sub-
stantially the same manner as "any touching of the sexual or other
intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, done for the purpose
of gratifying sexual desire of either party."' 0 6 The addition of the phrase
"other intimate parts" is objectionable on two grounds. First, it is vague
and indefinite and does not provide a clear standard of criminality. Second,
it does not promote the main aim of the section which should be "to
protect children against either heterosexual or homosexual genital manipu-
100 Model §213.5 makes indecent exposure a "misdemeanor," punishable by a one
year maximum under Model §6.08.
101 N.Y. §245.00 declares indecent exposure to be a "class B misdemeanor." The
maximum penalty for such an offense is set by N.Y. §70.15(2).
102 Michigan §2325 declares indecent exposure to be a "class C misdemeanor" under
Michigan §1415(c); the maximum term of imprisonment is set at 30 days.
103 Ploscowe, Sex Oflenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274, 282
(1966).
104 Model §213.4, Michigan §§2320-2322,N.Y. §§130.55-.65.
105 Tent. Draft No. 4, at 292.
106 Michigan §2301(c).
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lation."1 07 A hand on a girl's leg even in a darkened theatreOs does not
engender the "outrage, disgust or shame . . . in the victim" that is
thought to constitute the rationale for special treatment of the sexual
assault.109
The major difference between the Model Code and the state codes with
respect to sexual assault is in grading. The New York and Michigan Codes
provide a three-fold classification on the basis of the victim's age which
corresponds in general with their classifications for rape and sodomy. The
Model, on the other hand, provides for only a single degree of this offense.
This seems unsatisfactory. Clearly the shocking nature of the sexual
contact will vary at least with the degree of responsibility of the actor
for the victim's incapacity to consent. Where the sexual contact is brought
about by forcible compulsion or the administration of drugs, it should be
punished more heavily. Moreover, the Model Code itself recognizes that
heavier punishment is appropriate for rape and sodomy where the female
is less than 10 years old than where she is less than 16 years old. Why
it should fail in the area of sexual assault to apply this same principle,
punishing behavior with younger children more severely than with older,
is inexplicable.
The Model Code makes it a crime to have sexual intercourse, engage
in deviate sexual behavior or maintain sexual contact with a ward"O
or with a person "in custody of law or detained in a hospital [where] the
actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him.""' Neither the
New York nor the Michigan Codes explicitly cover this situation. There
is no doubt that such acts constitute "presumptive abuse of authority""12
for which punishment is proper. However, there may be sufficient coverage
under other provisions to eliminate the need for special treatment of this
situation.11 3 If not, then special provision should be made because "little
distinction exists between the use of threats to prevent resistance and taking
advantage of a position of authority to render resistance unlikely."' 14
IV. Conclusion
A consistent criminal code for sex offenders is unlikely to emerge
until there is agreement on the fundamental aims of the criminal law
in this area.1 1 5
The inconsistency inherent in the punishment of some consensual private
107 Ploscowe, note 103 supra, at 281.
10s Michigan at 189.
109 Tent. Draft No. 4 at 292.
110 Model §213.3(1)(b) and (c).
111 Model §213.4(7) and (8).
112 Model at 147.
113 Michigan at 183.
114 64 COLUM. L. REV., note 32 supra, at 1541.
115 Wheeler, note 69 supra, at 261.
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acts but not others and the frequent disregard of the deterrent and rehabili-
tative aims of the law have been emphasized throughout this article. The
Proposed Penal Code draws upon the best features of the Michigan, New
York and Model Codes in an effort to outline a scheme which is consistent,
reflective of the goals of criminal law, and enforceable. With respect to
the three major offenses - rape, sodomy, and sexual assault - the Pro-
posed Code consistently and with substantially similar language defines
the circumstances which will convert particular conduct into a crime. It
removes the legal condemnation of private consensual behavior because
of the basic unenforceability and weak deterrent effect of such laws. It
refuses to declare bestiality, necrophilia, or homosexuality crimes due to
the inability of punishment to rehabilitate such persons. The Proposed
Code strives to ensure maximum fairness for the defendant without
sacrificing the protection of youth, the preservation of public order or
the prevention of violence. It clearly and precisely defines the forbidden
conduct. It seeks to eliminate as much of the subjectivity from the trial
as possible by adopting the resistance standard for forcible rape and by
allowing the actor to defend by proving that he reasonably believed that the
female was over the statutory age of consent. The Code further requires
that a complaint be brought within three months of the alleged crime and
that all testimony be corroborated in order to convict an actor of a felony.
The newly enacted New York Code and the Michigan Draft achieve some
of these desirable results but further improvement and rationalization of
the criminal law in this area is still possible and much needed.
PROPOSED PENAL CODE
Section 1 Definitions
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means genital copulation and occurs upon any
penetration, however slight; emission is not required. (Derived from
Michigan § 2301(a))
(2) "Deviate sexual intercourse" means any act of sexual gratification
between persons not married to each other, involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another. (Derived from Michigan
§ 2301(b))
(3) "Sexual contact" means any touching of the genitalia of a person
not married to the actor, done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire
of either party. (Derived from Michigan § 2301(c))
(4) "Female" means any female who is not married to the actor. Per-
sons living together. as man and wife are married for purposes of this
Article, regardless of the legal status of their relationship otherwise. Spouses
living apart under a decree of judicial separation are not married to one
another for purposes of this Article. (Derived from Michigan § 2301(d))
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Section 2 Rape in the First Degree
A male who engages in sexual intercourse with a female is guilty of
rape in the first degree if
(1) he uses force to overcome resistance at least as great as the max-
imum resistance a female in the circumstances of the alleged victim could
reasonably offer to prevent penetration while avoiding serious risk of
death or serious bodily injury (Derived from 18 Stan. L. Rev. 680, 688); or
(2) he threatens to inflict on her or another person imminent death,
serious bodily injury or kidnapping, and she refrains from resisting because
of a reasonable belief that he will carry out his threats (Derived from
Model § 207.4(l)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4) and 18 Stan. L. Rev. 680, 688); or
(3) the female is physically powerless to resist or to communicate un-
willingness to an act and he knows of her condition (Derived from 18
Stan. L. Rev. 680, 689 and Michigan § 2301 (g)); or
(4) the female is less than 11 years old. (Derived from Michigan § 2310
(1)(c))
Section 3 Rape in the Second Degree
A male who engages in sexual intercourse with a female is guilty of
rape in the second degree if she is less than 14 years old and he is at
least 4 years older.
Section 4 Rape in the Third Degree
A male who engages in sexual intercourse with a female is guilty of
rape in the third degree if
(1) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance
by a woman of ordinary resolution (Derived from Model § 213.1(2)(a)
and 18 Stan. L. Rev. 680, 689); or
(2) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her
conduct by administering or employing drugs, intoxicants, or other means
for the purpose of preventing resistance (Derived from 18 Stan. L. Rev.
680, 689); or
(3) he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect which
renders her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct (Derived
from Model § 213.1(2)(b)); or
(4) he knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed
upon her or that she submits because she falsely supposes that he is her
husband (Derived from Model § 213.1(2)(c)); or
(5) she is less than 16 years old and he is at least 4 years older (De-
rived from Model § 213.3(1)(a)).
Section 5 Sodomy in the First Degree
A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
is guilty of sodomy in the first degree if
April 19681
Prospectus
(1) he uses force to overcome resistance at least as great as the max-
imum resistance a person in the circumstances of the alleged victim could
reasonably offer to prevent the act while avoiding serious risk of death
or serious bodily injury; or
(2) he threatens to inflict on the alleged victim or another person
imminent death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping, and the alleged
victim refrains from resisting because of a reasonable belief that he will
carry out his threats (Derived from Model § 207.5(1)(a) (Tent. Draft
No. 4)); or
(3) the alleged victim is physically powerless to resist or to commu-
nicate unwillingness to the act and the actor knows of the other's condition;
(4) the alleged victim is less than 11 years old (Derived from Michigan
§ 2315(l)(c).
Section 6 Sodomy in the Second Degree
A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
is guilty of sodomy in the second degree if the other person is less than
14 years old and the actor is at least 4 years older.
Section 7 Sodomy in the Third Degree
A person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person
is guilty of sodomy in the third degree if
(1) he compels the other person to participate by any threat that would
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution (Derived from Model
§ 213.2(2)(a)); or
(2) he has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise
or control his conduct by administering or employing drugs, intoxicants,
or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance (Derived from
Model § 213.2(l)(b)); or
(3) he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or
defect that renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct
(Derived from Model § 213.2(2)(b)); or
(4) he knows that the other person submits because he is unaware that
a sexual act is being committed upon him (Derived from Model § 213.2
(2)(c)); or
(5) the other person is less than 16 years old and the actor is at least
4 years older.
Section 8 Sexual Assault in the First Degree
A person commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree if he
subjects another person to sexual contact under any of the conditions of
Section 5 of this Article.
Section 9 Sexual Assault in the Second Degree
A person who subjects another person to sexual contact is guilty of
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sexual assault in the second degree if the other person is less than 14 years
old and the actor is at least 4 years older.
Section 10 Sexual Assault in the Third Degree
A person commits the crime of sexual assault in the third degree if
he subjects another person to sexual contact under any of the conditions
of Section 7 of this Article.
Section 11 Indecent Exposure
A person commits the crime of indecent exposure if, for the purpose
of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any person other
than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he
knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm (Derived from
Model § 213.5).
Section 12 Mistake as to Age
(1) Whenever in this Article the criminality of conduct depends on a
child's being below the age of 11, it is no defense that the actor did not
know the child's age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than
11 (Derived from Model § 213.6(1)).
(2) However, when criminality depends on the child's being below a
critical age other than 11, it is a defense for the, actor to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed the child to
be above the critical age (Derived from Model § 213.6(1)).
(3) The burden of injecting the issue of mistake is on the defendant,
but this does not shift the burden of proof. For this purpose the defendant
may introduce any relevant evidence of the female's previous experience
in, or knowledge of, sexual matters (Derived from 62 Yale L. J. 55, 80
and Michigan § 2331(2)).
Section 13 Prompt Complaint
No prosecution may be instituted under this Article unless the alleged
offense was brought to the notice of public authority within 3 months of
its occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than 16 years old or
otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within 3 months after a parent,
guardian or other competent person specially interested in the victim learns
of the .offense (Derived from Model § 213.6(4)).
Section 14 Corroboration
No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be
circumstantial. In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this
Article, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim
or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involve-
ment of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect
to alleged sexual activities carried out in private (Derived from Model
§ 213.6(5)).
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